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PREFACE 
The growing role  of the time factor  in problem solving is becoming universally 
recognized throughout the  world. At the  same time, this problem remains insuffi- 
ciently explored particularly in the  strategic aspect. This paper  describes the  
general outline of one of the most actual issues connected with the time saving 
impacts of the modern high technology revolution. The main purpose i s  to  deepen 
understanding and show the  interdependence between techological and managerial 
capabilities in the  time saving aspect.  Of course, radical strategic technological 
changes require  the  adequate responses f r o m  management systems and manager's 
personal skills. In their  turn,  technological changes strongly depend on the  
improved technique of t he  analytic possibilities, including the improved technique 
of the  analytical approach as a resul t  of international experience, could be  con- 
sidered t o  maintain the efficient interaction between technological and managerial 
capability. 
TIME SAVING STRATEGIES 
IN TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT 
A. Kochetkov 
Time Saving Impacts o f  High-Technology Strategic Changes 
The 1970s-1980s are "turbulent times" in which most countr ies  have t o  face 
t h e  necessity f o r  deep s t r uc tu r a l  changes in t he i r  economic s t r uc tu r e  and there -  
f o r e  in t h e  app rop r i a t e  social ,  political, and cul tural  systems (Drucker,  1980). 
This necessity emerges from extension of t h e  high technology revolution t ha t  i s  
considerably reshaping industrial  s t r uc tu r e s  and societal  institutions. The d i rec t  
expression of such a revolution, based on t h e  latest scientific advances,  i s  t h e  
widening list of high technologies, with global impacts on  economic development: 
robot ics ,  computers and computer-aided systems, telecommunications, ar t i f ic ia l  
engineering materials,  biogenetics, fibre-optics, word processors ,  nuclear  power, 
l a se rs ,  space  satell i tes,  etc. 
Among many inherent  features of t he  modern high-technology revolution, i t  is 
par t icular ly  important t o  emphasize i t s  time saving impact on  industrial  and 
nonproduction processes ,  because t h e  time saving effect  i s  an inherent  condition 
of high productivity and efficiency. A t  t h e  same time,however, t h e  s h a r e  of high- 
technology en te rpr i ses  in industry in t h e  1970s-1980s i s  limited t o  a comparatively 
narrow range  of manufacturing sec tors .  A s  a resul t ,  many industries find them- 
selves in t h e  same position as tradit ional industries,  with some negative conse- 
quences concerning t h e  level of productivity, quality, employment, etc. 
But theoret ical ly ,  based on  fundamental achievements and t rends  of science 
and technology, i t  i s  impossible t o  justify t he  existing uneveness of technological 
development; t h e r e  are no constra ints  f o r  high-technology implementation in any 
industry. The visable differentiation could be  explained by t h e  r a t h e r  di f ferent  
approach  taken by industries t o  s t ra teg ic  technological changes,  as well as by 
some ar t i f ic ia l  ba r r i e r s .  
The analysis shows t ha t  such constra ints  and b a r r i e r s  could be  overcome by 
introducing more improved management systems, and t he  s h a r e  of t h e  high- 
t e c h ~ o l o g y  sphe re  could b e  essentially extended, with considerable time-saving 
problem of improving strategically oriented. mznagement capabil i t ies,  which can be  
described, in t e r m s  of what i s  required of managers. 
The 1970s-1980s bring,  in addition, a c l ea r  awareness t ha t  a new phase of t h e  
high-technology revolution hz s  occur red ;  t ha t  i s  actuzl  competition manifests 
itself not only in t h e  s p h e r e  of science and technology, but is a lso  importznt in t h e  
s p h e r e  of new products ,  process ,  2nd markets. For  typical  business companies t h e  
environment dramatically changes: instead of a well-known, long-established tech- 
nology supported by educational knowledge and. techniczl  l i t e ra tu re ,  t h e r e  are 
developing innovation systems with unpredictable consequences. Accordingly, 
uninterrupted evolutionary growth is  being replaced by new, discontinuous t r ends  
associated with t h e  pulsating na ture  of technological progress .  A t  las t  market 
demand is  also transforming from relatively s table  to more changeable charac-  
t e r i s t i cs  (Finkelstein, and Newman, 1984). 
No less  essentizl  changes are character ized by t h e  internal  conditions of 
company activity,  where tradit ional management functions, such as r e sou rce s  allo- 
cation,  are losing t he i r  pr ior i ty .  Other functions, initially know-how management, 
are taking t he i r  place.  There  are some dramatic changes at t h e  staff-member 
level,  because educationzl knowledge and prac t ica l  exper ience is  rapidly becoming 
obsolete,  requiring managers t o  develop t h e  ability t o  regular ly  l e a rn  and develop 
management skill.  
In t h e  management of high-technology s t ruc tura l  chznge i t  i s  necessary t o  
account f o r  t h e  pulszting na ture  of technological changes,  according t o  which 
per iods  of accumulztive, quazti tat ive,  evolutionzry changes become periods of 
qualitative revolutionary leaps.  There  are t h r e e  basic phases of technologiczl 
p rogress  (Yakovecs, 1984). 
Firs t ,  t h e  more widespread choice r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  change of product /process  
'models in t h e  framework of t h e  same technological generation.  Second, t he  model 
choice could be  made bzsed on t h e  replacement of t h e  technological generation,  
while remaining at t h e  same time in t h e  framework of t h e  existing technical  level of 
t h e  econony. Third, t h e  choice of product /process  models could b e  linked with t h e  
appearance  of fundamental new technologies, which qualitatively determine t he  
transit ion of o t he r  model generations.  Each of these  technological t r ends  adds i t s  
pa r t i cu la r  contribution t o  t h e  s t r uc tu r a l  changes on t h e  different level of econ- 
o ~ y .  Pract ical ly ,  f o r  t h e  phases  before  z fundamental technological revolution, i t  
is more efficient t o  focus resources  initially on t h e  modernization of existing 
product /process  models. On t h e  con t ra ry ,  during t h e  c u r r e n t  high-technology 
revolution, t h e r e  is  t h e  opportunity t o  resolutely re fuse  routine choices and t o  
make s t ruc tura l  changes based on t h e  transmission to more promising technologi- 
cal  models. 
Of course ,  t h e  r e a l  choice will depend on many situational fac to rs :  economic 
scale ,  internalization level, r e sou rce  availability, management capabil i ty,  e tc . ,  but 
i t  i s  worthwhile t o  keep t h e  solution range  within t h e  framework of t h e  main 
choices descr ibed above (Luard,1983). 
An inherent  aspec t  of t h e  pulsating na ture  of technological development is  
concerned with t h e  uneven dynamics of aging processes  in t h e  basic industries. A s  
a resu l t  t h e r e  a r e  obsolete manufacturing plants and fac tor ies  eroding t h e  com- 
peti t ive edge of t h e  en te rpr i se .  Because of th is ,  i t  is worthwhile t o  include in stra- 
tegic managernext indicators of t h e  average  age  of industrial plznts. In t h e  1980s 
efficient manufacturing plznts have a n  average  age  of about 7-8.5 yezrs .  A t  the  
same t i n e ,  obsolescent pizrits have an  zverage  age  significantly higher  (in some 
cases  15-20 yea r s )  an2 as a resul t  they hzve lost  t he i r  competitive positions. 
There  is  a correspondence between indicators of z company's competitiveness and 
t h e  average  age  of industrial plants. Therefore ,  increzsing economical 
competitiveness in t he  framework of long-term s t ruc tura l  changes presupposes 
thz t  the  corresponding dynamics (diminishing) of average age in the  basic indus- 
t r i e s  shol;!d be reflected in adequate investments in high technology and moderni- 
zatior. of manufacturing plants (Heertje,  1983). 
It i s  very important also t o  note tha t  there  exists z g rez t  diversity of compet- 
ing s t ra tegies  thz t  conld be adopted (Arthur,  1984). In the  1970s and 1980s the  
scientific work done in anticipation greatly exceeds t he  possibilities of implemen- 
tation. In fact ,  in each company only z limited number of potentially efficient tech- 
nologies hzve been implemented. Many o thers  (among the  remaining) could be  just 
as promising, but do not have some of the initial adaptation advantages. Thus, i t  i s  
not necessary t o  follow advanced competitors and adopt t he  same technologies. If 
a given company hzs  z sufficiently high- technology adaptation capability, i t  could 
ado?t competing technology tha t  is not yet  implemented. By technology adaptation 
cz?ab!:ity w e  understand h e r e  t he  combination of a company's R & D capacity, 
investment potential, management capability, and the  region's infrastructure  and 
labor  market capacity. 
Information Technology-based Strategic Changes 
Different high technologies have different time-saving effects. From this  
aspect ,  we note the  dominating large-scale time impacts of information technology, 
which has  c rea ted ,  f i r s t  of aL!, z basis f o r  the  rapid development and application of 
robots ,  automated manufacturing, and the  automated office. Among o t h e r  applica- 
tions of information technology-based systems are undersea and space  explora- 
tions with robotic devices, mining, construction, and medical and household robots 
(Jackson and Balthazar, 1984; Masudz, 1980; Pi t t  and Smith, 1984; US Leadership, 
1983). Three key high-technology elements - microelectronics, computers, and 
telecommunications, taken together ,  have formed a powerful time-intensive infor- 
mation technology tha t  has  become a basis f o r  accelerzted shifts in reindustriali- 
zation of developed. countries,  with automation of production and nonproduction 
processes,  as well as deep changes in business, education, health ca re ,  
researches ,  and many o the r  forms of human activity on local, national, and global 
scales (Eurof utures ,  1984; Szyperski, 1983). 
The contribution of telecommunication technology t o  t he  time-saving objective 
has  strongly increzsed. with fibre-optics implementation. N e w  communication tech- 
nology creates the  possibility of handling z g rea t  number of messages simultane- 
ously.. In combination with computer and satell i te opportunities, t h e  telecommuni- 
cation technology, using f ib re  optic cables, videotext, te le text ,  cellular tele- 
phones, has increased its productive potential t o  a considerable degree.  
Similar advances are taking place in software technology, including new high- 
capacity local s to rage  and common operating system (Jackson and Balthazar, 
1984). 
These advances c r ea t e  a wide spectrum of new opportunities f o r  managers. 
Apart from the  many applications of information technology now known, i t  is diffi- 
cult to  foresee others .  The broad implementation of information technology 
expresses  itself in the  fact t ha t  not less than half of t he  total  labor  fo rce  in many 
developed countries i s  employed in t he  information sec tor  (Rubin and Sapp, 1981). 
There a r e  technical, economic, and social reasons f o r  such broad applications 
of information technology-bzsed systems. The combination of a high integratior, of 
silicon chips (large scale integration - LSI) with a diminishing of t he i r  cost has 
created favorzble conditions f o r  t he  broad  implementation of microprocessors. On 
the  basis of new types of rn ic ro~rocessors  the system of "distributed intelligence" 
is being sussessfu:!y built; thz t ,  in i ts  t a m ,  is becoming a bzsic fo r  deep changes in 
the  divisior. of :zbor, suck as forms of production concentration and cooperztion, 
as well as planning, controll ing,  manageaent communications, e t c .  
A new, large-scale,  time saving s t ra tegy  on t h e  basis of "distributed intelli- 
gence" is  t h a t  of c lus te red  microcomputers building on local  a r e a  networks (LANs). 
These provide opportunit ies f o r  t h e  establishment of a universal  s tandard network 
t h a t  cocla connect u s e r s  with di f ferent  types  of hardwzre .  The next s t e p  is  t h e  
combination of LAN with work-stations, bztch p rocessors ,  d a t a  bzse  machines, etc., 
t o  achieve high-speed information technology. P r o g r e s s  in t h e  development and 
application of "distributed intelligence" creates favorable  conditions f o r  t h e  via- 
bility of smaller ,  high-technology e n t e r p r i s e s  in which t h e  p rocesses  of R & D and 
engineering can b e  considerably acce le ra ted .  The most s t r ik ing example of infor- 
mation technology implementation with a large-scale time-saving e f fec t  i s  t h e  
CAD/CAM system (computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing), which 
functions t o  create, display, analyze, and s t o r e  engineering designs. The outcome 
is  d i rect ly  t r a n s f e r r e d  in to  t h e  system via computer programs,  result ing in com- 
p u t e r  control  of t h e  production machines by means of NC (numerical control  
machine tools) in combination with programmable con t ro l l e r s  and robo ts .  The 
CAD/CAM market  grew in t h e  e a r l y  1980s by about  35% a y e a r .  Such systems resu l t  
in increased productivity and typically pzy f o r  themselves in l e ss  than two y e a r s .  
The estimated d i r e c t  time saving e f fec t  of CAD/CAM is expressed  in t h e  cutting of 
t h e  manufacturing lead time by 25% and in increasing productivity by as much as 
four  times t h e  c u r r e n t  level (Dorf,1983). Such a time-saving contribution of 
CAD/CAM systems is a r e s u l t  of accelera t ing t h e  life cycle of many products  by 
shortening t h e  distance from ideas t o  goods znd. se rv ices .  Firms t h a t  succeed by 
duplicating products  at low cost  will respond t o  product  innovators much more 
rapidly and a c c e l e r a t e  t h e  p rocesses  of substitution of o lde r  products  (Parsons,  
1983). 
This mezns economizing t h e  time-design-manufacturing cycle  and t h e  pract i -  
cz l  elimination of t h e  gaps  between many existing operat ions .  The next  advances 
with high-technology are t h e  integration of a l l  CAD/CAM functions in to  a unified 
system with z common d a t e  base ,  t o  combine i t  with robo ts ,  FMS, computer material  
control  systems, and o t h e r  facil i t ies (Pit t  m d  Smith, 1984); t h a t  is t o  set about 
industriz: production of completely automztic factor ies .  The pr imary economic 
obstzcle  t o  implementing t h e  time szving computer-controlled mznufacturing tech- 
nology is  t h e  l a rge  initial capi tz l  investments needed. In addition, some difficult 
technical  problems must b e  solved in o r d e r  t o  move t o  fully automate2 factor ies .  
Among these  are improvements of t h e  mechanical ha rdware  and its in te r face  with 
e lect ronics  and,  t o  a l e s s e r  degree ,  t h e  development of more advanced e lect ronic  
hardware  and a p p r o p r i a t e  software.  In any c a s e ,  t h e  automated fac to ry  as a pro- 
duct  of high-technology implementation will b e  t h e  most radical  contribution t o  
meet time-saving requirements  (Survey of Management Issues, 1983). 
No less  a rad ica l  penetra t ion is t h a t  of information technology di rect ly  into 
t h e  management s p h e r e  (Wynne and Otway, 1982). There  are different  views as t o  
whether t h e  dominant impact of information technology is t o  centra l ize  o r  decen- 
t ra l ize .  Now i t  i s  becoming c l e a r e r  t h a t  considerable opportunit ies o c c u r  in both 
di rect ions  and actual  t r e n d s  will depend, as previously, on t h e  dominant policy. The 
powerful influence of information technology on administrative productivity,  due t o  
t h e  time-saving e f fec t ,  h z s  also become c l e a r .  I t  i s  important t h a t  inforrnatiori 
technology f i rs t ly  mechznizes most rout ine  functions t o  r e l e a s e  work-time f o r  
c rea t ive  l abor .  Xo less  important are forthcoming opportunit ies t o  establish a 
cooperat ive  network - local ,  regional,  nztionzl, and. global. In t h e  long term, 
zLnost all functions of most business and,  t o  a considerzble d e g r e e ,  o t h e r  f irms can 
b e  enhanced and economized on t h e  basis of information technology. Thus, infor- 
mation technology has  a considerzble  impact or, macro- and micro-economics, and. 
i s  now bccorning z s t r a t e g i c  concern  f o r  most compznies in t h e  1980s. Informatior. 
technology is changing the  nature  of the industry's product and services.  In the 
time aspect ,  information technology may substantially a l t e r  (reduce) the product 
life cycle and significantly increase t he  speed of distribution (Parsons, 1983). The 
time lag between an initial idea f o r  a new product o r  process  and i ts  wide produc- 
tion an2 utilization is virtually eliminated. Information technology acce le ra tes  the 
division of industrial companies into two types: those tha t  have assimilated 
appropriate  high technology and those that  continued to  re ly  on manuzl opera- 
tions. Information-technology based companies incur g rea t  technical and economi- 
cal advantages by achieving cost/quality control without the traditional economies 
of scale. To increase efficiency, information technology-based companies develop 
new products, services ,  and processes,  new distribution channels, new management 
systems. 
New-Time Saving Requi rements  for Management  and Manage r s  
The high-technology revolution brings with i t  some strong implications fo r  
management and managers, implying s t ra tegic  changes in practically all managerial 
systems, processes,  s t ruc tures ,  and techniques. However, in spi te  of the  spectrum 
of information-technology opportunities, t he  ability of most organizations and 
managers t o  zssimilate new high-technology advances lies f a r  behind the  availabil- 
ity. A s  a resul t  a "strategic technological gap" emerges and strongly impacts on 
socio-economic development. What response is required from management t o  cope 
with forthcoming s t ra tegic  high-technology changes s o  a s  t o  increase t he i r  posi- 
tive and reduce t he i r  negative effects in terms of time saving? The experience 
accumulated in developed countries (mainly by high technology and well-managed 
companies) includes the  following managerial principles. 
Allocating the  main business organizations - companies, firms, corporations,  
enterpr ises  - according t o  available power and appropriate  resources  t o  effec- 
tive, self-supporting s t ra tegic  and operating activities (under appropr ia te  control 
of c e n t n l  industrial and governmental agencies). This is a cr i t ical  component in 
t he  whole of the  management system, because only a sufficiently high self- 
supporting basis creates t he  possibility of reducing t h e  time needed f o r  problem- 
solving. Now, most policymakers ag ree  that  national policy is only able t o  contri- 
bute, but not to  solve, t he  cu r r en t  microlevel conflicts. 
Accelerated improvement of innovation management techniques, which should 
be ar. inherent p a r t  of all changes in activity: R 8c D ,  engineering, production, 
marketing, service.  
A rising level of coordination of policymakers' actions that  directly influence 
the  dnration of decision-making and decision-implementing processes.  I t  is 
especizlly important t o  ensure close interaction in t he  chain "deliverer-- 
producer-user". 
Considerable attention to  be  given t o  t h e  implementability problem, with t he  
development of specific techniques t o  closely coordinate decision making and 
decision implementing. 
Introduction a t  cor~plex  cost-quantity-quality-time cr i te r ia  f o r  planning and 
assessing a cor~pany ' s ,  activity with broad use of negotiation techniques. 
The learning approach:  achievement of s t ra teg ic  flexibility, with time-saving 
effects ,  through lezrning actions di rected toward ac increasing s t ra teg ic  
management capability. Among t he  basic tools of t h e  leaning approach ,  t h e  
key is  t o  build. s t ra teg ic  monitoring and control  systems. 
Developing s t rong  management techniques f o r  t he  integration of policy 
actions in t he  framework of existing multiheaded institutional s t ruc tures .  
Developing a new s e t  of management skills (such as network management), 
which r equ i r e  a clear-thinking, methodical mind. 
Taken toge ther  these  managerial principles are directed t o  combat existing. 
bzsic forms of imbalance, which determine t he  main time loss in t h e  business 
sphere :  
Power imbalance: i .e .  excessive centralization of decision-making responsibil- 
ity at t h e  top of t h e  management system. 
Imbalance between dif ferent  forms of s t ra teg ic  changes: technological, 
economic, social ,  organizational. 
Imbalance between decision-making and decision-implementing s tages  of stra- 
tegic policy. 
Imbalance between R & D and production/marketing processes .  
Interorganizational imbalance: i.e. unsynchronized actions of di f ferent  organ- 
fzztions in t h e  framework of unique problems and objectives.  
Improving Techno l og i ca l  Capab i l i t y  of Strategic Decision-Making Systems 
The main contribution t o  t he  time-saving objectives can b e  given by s t ra teg ic  
decision making. To a l a r ge  extent ,  in business organizations such a system i s  
realized in t h e  long-range planning, but not exactly because some important stra- 
tegic  choices concerning a given organization are made externally.  The t radi-  
tional approach  to s t ra teg ic  planning focuses on r e s ou rce  allocation processes .  
Under t h e  high-technology revolution, t h e r e  are t w o  m a j o r  objectives f o r  stra- 
tegic  planning (Pr int ice ,  1984; Rhenman, 1983): 
(1) To promote high technology innovation. 
(2) To in tegra te  technological and o t h e r  s t ra teg ic  changes - human r e sou rce ,  
capital ,  product ,  market.  
For  business compznies high technologies have,  f o r  t h e  m o s t  p a r t ,  been con- 
s idered in t h e  context of product/market development. The increasing competitior, 
level in t h e  1980s s t inu la tes ,  however, a more comprehensive approach.  To 
acqui re  competitive advantages and achieve cos t  reduction,  high technologies 
have become important t o  p rocess  management. Apart  from this ,  in t h e  long term 
i t  h z s  increzsed. t h e  importance of accounting :or not only existing but a iso  
emerging technologies. Accordingly, i n d ~ s t r i a l  companies face  cornplicatel 
problems concerning knowledge of improved technology-evaluation techniques, 
because e r r o r s  incur red  in estimating t he  prospect ive  benefits  have become cru-  
cial  f o r  company viability. Two common e r r o r s  are underestimztion of t h e  time and 
r e s o u r c e s  needed t o  achieve an effective functioning of t h e  innovation technology 
and overestimation of t h e  ave r age  rate of use in calculating expected r e tu rn s  
(Gold. 1983). 
The general  s t r a t eg i c  management response t o  improve t h e  s t ra teg ic  techno- 
logical capability of business companies lies in a more intensive analytical 
approach t o  s t ra teg ic  decision making. Thus, s t ra teg ic  planning is becoming more 
quantitative and or iented t o  t he  use of computer simulatior,, in addition t o  t radi-  
tional e x p e r t  information. Also, c r i t e r i a  of technology assessment are becoming 
more comprehensive. Some American companies have successfully used so-called 
r e s e a r c h  management techniques in building a matrix t ha t  couples R & D plans with 
business objectives.  A s  a resu l t ,  t h e  business-high technology portfolio is  esta- 
blished zs a basis f o r  s t ra teg ic  choice. The o the r  promising analytical technique 
f o r  s t ra teg ic  planning is  t he  PIMs program(profit  impact of market s t ra tegy ;  
Albert, K.,1983), some new advances which are being developed at IIASA now, such 
as ISSMI (Integrated S t ra teg ies  of S t ruc tura l  and Market Improvement). The 
mechanism of t he  ISSM: program involves computerized verification of a range  of 
hypotheses about t he  s t ra teg ic  behavior of a given regional-company system, tak- 
ing into account t h e  corresponding behavior of competitive systems (those produc- 
ing t h e  same products).  The s t ra teg ic  behavior of each  regional-company system, 
in tu rn ,  i s  determined by s t r uc tu r a l  change and h z s  a number of a l ternat ive  forms. 
The ISSM! progrzm ope ra t e s  by using information on t h e  structural-economic 
s t rz tegy  z l ternat ives  f o r  t he  regions,  which are considered as a single multipro- 
duct company o r  as a set of companies whose s t ra teg ic  behavior depends or, 
in terre la t ions  of in ternal  and ex te rna l  factors .  The evaluation of technological, 
investment, employment, and ecological capzbil i t ies of a region allows policymak- 
ers t o  exzmine t h e  f ac to r s  important t o  a long-tern,  sustainzble economic growth, 
in addition t o  more immediate values of profitability. 
Thus, use of computerized techniques such as PIMs o r  ISSMI programs allows 
us t o  make s t ra teg ic  plans more quantitative. This analytical approach simultaine- 
ously p resen ts  t h e  bes t  remedy t o  cope with uncertainty.  Under t h e  impact of 
large-scale technological changes t h e  fu tu re  of company, regional,  and national 
economies coul? not be considered in t h e  long term as unique and fully determined; 
t h e  impact possibilities a r e  multiple (Godet, 1982). The basic conceptual idea of 
how t o  cope with uncertainty consists of developing and improving s t ra teg ic  plan- 
ning. A s  r ega rd s  time-saving requirements,  these  could b e  met by building mechan- 
isms of adaptabil i ty into planning and implementation processes.  Here ,  t h e  
decisive fac to r  is t h e  analytical approach  t ha t  i s  becoming t h e  basis f o r  forming 
ear ly  warning systems. A set of methods used in s t ra teg ic  decisionr-making t o  
cope with uncertainty includes, additionally, a range  of forecasted scenar ios ,  
sequential decisions, ea r ly  warning systems, contingency plans, etc.(Kono, 1984). 
In p rac t ice ,  t h e  s t ra teg ic  technological changes emphasized above, are 
closely connected with o t h e r  s t ra teg ic  f o r ce s  implemented by governments and 
firms, f o r  example cost /pr ice  policy, differentiation of product and segmentatiori 
of market,  e tc .  The choice  of one o r  a set of these  s t ra teg ies  depends on, and in i t s  
t u r n  influences, t h e  technological changes.  According t o  product/market stra- 
tegies t h e  app rop r i a t e  high technology could be  chosen znd assimilzted. One such 
technology may contr ibute  t o  cos t  leadership and another  t o  reducing waste and 
improving productivity (Pe te r s ,  1982). 
The power of izformatior, technology is t h e  rezso:: why most f irms must effi- 
c i e n t ! ~  support  and re in force  such high techno!ogy. This means tha t  s t ra teg ic  
planning should include a set of actions as to how, on t h e  basis of information tech- 
nology, to reduce  time and cost, and improve productivity and quality. For  exam- 
ple,  t o  support  a low cost  s t ra teg ic  policy at t h e  level of industrial companies, i t  i s  
necessary t o  strategically plan t h e  implementation of computer-aided and process  
engineering systems, as well zs pro jec t ,  process ,  labor,sale,  and cost  control  sys- 
tems. To implement these  investment-intensive systems, t h e  company will need t o  
deepen i t s  specialization and narrow the  product se t .  
But f o r  many companies t h e  problem of understanding how information tech- 
nology affects  t h e i r  business under  given situations remains difficult. There  is no 
o t h e r  way to achieve such understanding than to constantly link information tech- 
nology opportunit ies with t he  more tradit ional set of s t ra tegies .  The resu l t  of such 
a n  analysis could be  then used t o  design resource  allocation, education, training,  
etc. To be  based on high technology, a s t ra teg ic  decision-making system should be  
information intensive.. Fi rs t  of a l l ,  many technological fa i lures  are explained by 
only one reason: t ha t  managers are unfamiliar with t h e  technologies t o  be  assimi- 
la ted (Gold, 1983). In t he  cases of CAD/CAM and o the r  advanced systems, operating 
staff usually lack sufficient exper t i se  to evaluate e i t he r  prospect ive  applications 
or to compare with a l ternat ive ,  competitive technological systems. Therefore ,  t he  
organization of special  case  studies and surveys  about  technological opportunit ies 
is an i r h e r en t  element of a s t ra teg ic  decision-making system, as is t h e  initiation of 
appropr ia te  educational e f fo r t s  on t h e  basis of specialized training programs. 
Moreover, t h e  most valuable information in many cases is accumulated by people in 
organizations. As a resu l t ,  t h e  establishment of a n  internal  information-flow net- 
work tha t  ensures  intensive contact  between members at all  organizational levels 
i s  necessary.  The o t h e r  side of th is  p rob l emi s  t h e  creat ion of ex t e rna l  informa- 
tion ne tworks ,  which must ensure  t h e  possibility of intensive information contacts  
on a global scale.  
I n t e g r a t i n g  and Implement ing Strategic Decision-Making 
As exper ience shows, t he  considerable losses are due t o  a timegap between 
s t ra teg ic  decision making and decision implementation. Accordingly, t i m e  saving 
aims imply close coordination at these  s tages  of integrated s t ra teg ic  policy. 
This principle st ipulates building implementability into s t ra teg ic  mznagement 
techniques, traditionally or iented mzinly to improvement of t h e  decision-making 
process  (Ansoff, 1982). In accordance  with th is  principle i t  is necessary t o  pro- 
vide a care fu l  p repara t ion  of t he  implementation conditions a l ready presen t  in t he  
policymaking process .  Such prepara t ion  will ensure  t h e  rapid  implementation of 
s t ra teg ies  (King, 1983). 
Many r e s e a r c h e r s  and bnsinessmen a g r e e  now tha t  reorganization of t h e  
human ro le  i s  t h e  key f ac t o r  in implementing s t ra teg ies  based on high technology. 
A simple approach suggests tha t  new computer-aided systems make t h e  human con- 
tr ibution less  complex. But a more systematic approach  i l lus t ra tes  t ha t  t h e  new 
conditions and innovative and cooperat ive  styles,  as well as t h e  uncertainty and 
dynamics, on t he  con t r a r y ,  inc rease  t he  human role ;  tha t  is ,  with r e spec t  to 
management knowledge and skills. 
Thus, f o r  management t h e  s t r a t eg i c  development of human capability should be  
cor re la ted  with t h e  development of high technology capability. The mair, tools f o r  
meeting these  needs a r e  rebuilding t h e  systems of education and training on t he  
basis of t h e  lezrning approach  (Horwitch, 1984; Kozmetsky, 1984; Michael, 1982). 
Apar t  from basic knowledge, t h e  education system is required to teach people how 
t o  l ea rn  on t h e  job. Such learning could be  achieved in two ways: by formal train- 
ing and by self-training, but  t h e  best  resu l t s  would be  obtained through a combina- 
tion of these .  
Other a r e a s  fo r  realization of human potential in management lie in creating 
innovative, organizational climates and cultures. To reduce the time f o r  adapta- 
tion of a new member t o  the  organizational style, t h e r e  is the  promising experience 
of estzblishing work contacts between students and organizations during the  edu- 
cationzl period. In addition, through such contacts, students can accumulate some 
experience of the  high-technology being appropriated by given organizations. 
The increasing role  of the  human fac tor  in management activity is  reflected in 
t he  substitution of some administrative channels of decision making by negotia- 
tions. This could be a promising way t o  diminish the  danger of bureaucratization 
and increase initiative development. 
Reduction of t he  role  of formal administrative decision-making i s  achieved not 
only through development of t he  negotiations technique, but also through the  
development, without papers ,  of face-to-face communication, including d i rec t  and 
indirect (using telecommunication) forms. An increasingly less  formal organization 
of problem-solving in i ts  turn requires  a diminishing of organizational hierarchy 
and a reduction of t h e  number of s t ructural  levels. The time-saving effect of such 
a transformation is  evident. 
Thus, t he re  is the  need t o  develop icformal networks of management (human) 
reiztionships as an  alternative,  to  some degree,  t o  develop formal organizational 
st:ructures. In pract ice ,  in business relationships t he re  is  such a latent s t ruc ture ,  
very frequently more effective than administrative channels. But in o the r  cases 
t h e  solution taken within t he  framework of this latent s t ruc ture  contradicts socie- 
tal c r i t e r ia .  The problem-solving approach he re  is  t o  develop organizations with 
open-system ztti tudes,  recognizing the  power of network relationships and manag- 
ing such networks consciously. 
I t  i s  quite obvious tha t  the  human fac tor  is not only an area of unlimited t ime-  
saving opportunities, but is at the s a m e  time, t he  sphe re  of most difficulties and 
constraints. The actual resistance t o  t he  implementation of new high technology 
emerges not from obsoiete machines, but from "obsolete" people and from organi- 
zational resistance. Such resistance can lead t o  time-extensive management, which 
make 012 zny new technology during i ts  assimilation. International experience 
shows tha t  t o  overcome human and organizational resistance t o  forthcoming high 
technology it  i s  necessary, f i r s t  of a!, t o  rebuild existing reward systems, t o  
replace key people, and to  pass s t a f f  members through special training courses.  
The resistance t o  high technology is not lost automatically; t o  overcome it  requi res  
planning. 
In many cases, t he  process  of s t ra tegy implemention faces some difficulties 
due t o  the  multilevel, multisectoral, and multiorganizational nature  of society. A s  
a resul t  i t  i s  increasingly necessary for a superior  coordination of s t ra tegic  
action in time and space. A s  high technology affects  products and processes,  con- 
siderable changes occur  in t he  relationships between an industry and its suppliers 
and users.  For example, the  use of sophisticated quality control systems by the  
autoindustry is forcing s teel  producers  t o  become much m o r e  quality conscious 
(Parsons, 1983). And, of course,  t he  high technology supplier will become an  
important fo rce  f o r  a firm tha t  depends on such facilities. 
A s  a result  a new cooperation of networks is being created.  At the  same time, 
t he  substitution of paper-based communications by electronic mail and the  intro- 
duction of more sophisticated telecommunication systems establish more favorable 
conditions f o r  t he  intensification of cooperative links. To improve policy co- 
ordination is very important because the  considerable and ineffective time lag 
betweec decision making and irnplemention, as well as between policy stages,  often 
occurs  ir, situations where s t ra tegies  of organizations zre chosen without agree- 
ment with o ther  existing governments!, regionzl, znc! o ther  guiding crf ter ia  
(Rothwell, 1982). To achieve time-saving on the  basis o? a higher level of policy 
coordination a r e  such well-tested technological remedies a s  standardization of 
product and management technologies, development of telecommunication net- 
works, mztrix organizational s t ructures ,  and some o the r  updzted formal systems. 
There are considerably fewer proposals fo r  improving management coordina- 
tion and cooperation in t he  a r e a  of human factors ,  although t h e  coordination of 
human interests  is potentially a more promising remedy f o r  cooperative activity. 
In this area, t h e r e  is  also a r ich international experience about t he  technique of 
negotiations and contracts.  Under the  conditions of a high-technology revolution, 
a "front end" in cooperation mznagement work is  formed by the  know-how of inno- 
vative activity. The development of cooperation in this  field could, t o  a large 
extent,  become a time-saving management s t ra tegy realized in regional, nztional, 
and international frameworks (Kochetkov, 1981). 
In conditions of relatively more decentralized economics cooperation in 
know-how, production, marketing, and o the r  forms of business activity could be 
more effectively achieved by negotiations and contracts.  That is ,  t h e r e  is an 
urgent necessity t o  substitute many existing administrative forms of decision mak- 
ing with channels of negotiations. There a r e  many a r e a s  of negotiations techniques 
tha t  must now be rapidly learned and implemented (Albert, 1983). Negotiations as 
a means fo r  cooperative effor t  tends t o  spread a t  t he  level of a group o r  in per-  
sona: activity. In many cases with a small team as the  basic unit of human organiza- 
tion in t he  business activity,  i t  is worthwhile t o  set t he  goals on the  basis of nego- 
tiations about the  team's task in terms of quantity and quality of work, conditions, 
time o: implementation, and payment. Moreover, negotiations could be  the  basis 
also f o r  t e a m  optimization as t o  team membership (for  example minimizing the  
number who chose personnel,  etc.) .  As international experience shows, delegating 
t o  a team total  responsibility (cutting across  all operating functions) f o r  work per-  
formance gives t he  most effective r e s i l t s  and, as a rule ,  contributes t o  a diminish- 
ing of the  time span from the initial idea t o  user  utilization of a product (Finkel- 
stein,  1984). 
It i s  very important f o r  s t ra tegy implemention tha t  a considerable mass of 
capital funds be  accumulated, but resources  constraints make inevitable the  typi- 
cal situation fo r  managers in which obsolete and new technologies coexist with 
each o ther  during long periods. Introduction of ou r  thinking c r ea t e s  simiiar situa- 
tions in management principles, organizational forms, and methods. In addition, 
many new principles are not well understood due to  t h e  complexity, uncertainty, 
and dynamics of technological development. Under these conditions, t h e  role  of 
investigation using model experiments could increasingly become a n  inherent p a r t  
of s t ra teg ic  change management. Such speciaUy organized s t ra tegic  management 
experiences could take t h e  function of discovering opportunities and the  means of 
t he i r  implementation. 
There i s  no well-known way of how to  manage high-technology development f o r  
the purposes of society. There is time to  sezrch  f o r  ways through experimentation 
and generation of the  resul ts  (Goldberg, 1984). 
High Technology Venture Management 
One of t he  main time-saving s t ra tegies  of the  1970s-1980s hzs  been the  broad 
development of new high-technology ventures,  of which the re  a r e  two types. 
Most occur  in small and medium-sized, new in~ova t ive  firms oriented t o  the  
rapid achievement of high-technology results.  Such venture  firms have success- 
fully proved the i r  con7etit ive zdvantage in comparison with la rge  f i r m :  they 
have generated, grown, and give:: market life to  more than half of the  high 
technology-irinovatiocs ir, the  1970s-1980s. Therefore,  large companies have 
initiated. new high technology-ventures by developing them in special  c en t e r s  
within t he  frzmework of t h e i r  s t ruc tures .  The viability of such innovations will be 
tested during t he  1980s. I t  i s  also necessary t o  explain t h e  na ture  of t he  time- 
saving efriciencies of small, high-technology based firms because t h e r e  is  much 
evidence t ha t  t he  scope f o r  smaller producers  is reduced due t o  increased cost of 
r e s e a r c h  and development, product standardization, capital  intensive require-  
ments, machinery introduction, e tc .  
The major reason f o r  t h e  viability of small ven ture  firms i s  t h e i r  zbility t o  
give life t o  many new high technologies two or t h r e e  times more quickly than can 
l a r g e  firms: t ha t  is ,  small ven ture  firms are thus ab le  t o  gain time and t o  win t h e  
competition. 
The reasons f o r  t h e  considerable time-saving efficiency of small venture  firms 
are in t h e  innovative na t u r e  of high-technology development processes  and in t h e  
special  fea tu res  of r e s e a r c h ,  development, and engineering. Owing to these  pecu- 
l iari t ies,  high- technology ventures  can escape t h e  sad f a t e  of tradit ional smzll 
firms. 
The time-saving e f fec t  of smaller ven ture  companies a r i s e s  from the i r  flexible 
and easily changed s t r uc t u r e s  and t he i r  readiness  to t ake  a high business r i sk .  
Small firms who can rapidly adopt  new high technology and reduce ,  on th i s  basis, 
t h e  product development cycle,  gain a competitive advantage o v e r  l a rge  com- 
panies. Large  companies, on t h e  con t r a ry ,  due to t h e  complexity of orgznizational 
rebuilding are, in many cases, limited in new technological initiatives. Thus, t h e  
development of innovation-oriented small-to-medium ven ture  business en te rpr i ses  
should be considered as a considerable contribution to accelerat ing technological 
development as a whole. This is  proved by innovation management p rac t ice ,  ini- 
tially in t h e  US (Oakey, 1984, Bullock, 1983), especially in t h e  San Francisco Bay 
area of Californiz, including Silicon Valley. 
A t  t h e  same time, t h e  s epa r a t e  functioning of such companies is ,  as a r u l e  not 
competitive, although w e  can see t h e  happy emergence of new firms (Texas Instru- 
ment Corporation,  as a typical  example). But, in most cases ,  small, high technology 
venture  firms engage in d i r ec t  subcontracting with l a rge  companies. Apart from 
this,  t h e r e  is a propensity in small, high-technology firms f o r  products  t o  enjoy 
relatively sho r t  l ife cycles,  frequently as l i t t le as five yea r s  (Oakey, 1983). Small 
venture  firms are ab le  zlso to successfully a r r a n g e  part-time r e s e a r c h  and 
development. The considerable time-saving effect  obtained by smal l  high- 
technology venture  firms in t he  engineering s tages  occurs  because in many well- 
managed high-technology companies t h e  investment proport ions  between r e sea r ch ,  
development, and engineering s tages  are 1:3:10. In a more broad sense,  engineer- 
ing management i s  t h e  management of intensive know-how of product ,  process ,  and 
people, as a basis f o r  productivity growth. A s  exper ience shows, t h e  time length 
of s t ra teg ic  technological changes depends on t h e  engineering contribution. In 
well-managed companies t h e  time of t h e  transit ion to new product /process  models 
is not more than one to two years .  
The exper ience accumulated by high-technology venture  firms allows us t o  
formulate a set of guiding principles f o r  well-managed, time-saving s t ra teg ies  (Ans- 
of:, 1982; Bullock, 1983; Kozmetsky, 1984). These principles give concre te  
expression t o  t h e  basic axioms of t h e  dynamic synchronization of s t ruc tura l  
changes considered above. 
- The cr i t ical  r o l e  of t h e  bzsic product/market business idea of a venture  f o r  
choosing t he  app r op r i a t e  direction of high-technology development. Such a 
choice ir,c!udes testing of t h e  technical  and manufacturing feasibilities, taking 
into account resources ,  R & D,  organizational and. market limits. 
- The necessity t o  in tegra te  a l l  organizational pieces - objectives,  s t r uc tu r e ,  
reward,  decision making, people and o t h e r s  - into interdependent systems, s o  
t h a t  i t  will be  impossible t o  change one organizational dimension without 
changing a l l  t h e  o thers .  
- Strategically planned change in t h e  forms and techniques of organizational 
support  at each  s tage  of venture  development: formulating t h e  basic business 
idea - creat ing a prototype of t h e  new technologies - production and market,  
test ing of a number of initial models - natural  growth - volume of production - 
s t ra teg ic  maneuvering t o  achieve t h e  purposes  of basic business idea. 
The main difficulty of such a n  approach  is t o  predict  t h e  changes from one 
s tage  t o  ano ther  and t h e  transit ion from r e sea r ch  t o  engineering functions, and 
then  t o  manufacturing and marketing. If such changes are reasonably predictable  
it is possible t o  plan t h e  organizational changes, including t h e  transit ion of t he  
mainly informal ven ture  organization of t h e  f i r s t  s t ages  t o  multifunctional organi- 
zation, tha t  coordinates and controls ,  at o the r  stages.  'If in t h e  growth s tage  t h e  
problem of managing product  diversity a r i ses ,  t h e  venture  must decentra l ize  some 
product management. If t h e  necessity t o  develop a second generation product-line 
arises i t  is worthwhile t o  set up a s e p a r a t e  group f o r  th i s  purpose.  If t h e  problem 
of diversification zrises (at  t he  s t ra teg ic  maneuvering s tage)  i t  i s  important t o  fol- 
low t h e  s t ep s  t o  decentralization with development of t h e  product ,  market ,  o r  
region prof i t  c en t e r  network (Ansoff, 1982). 
Thus, planned, in tegrated technological-organizationa! s t ra teg ic  changes are 
t h e  s o u r ce  of time-saving effects  and thus  t h e  elimination of waste in t he  long term. 
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